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Cant passthrough RX 5700 XT

I was trying to passtrough my only gpu but there seems to be a problem with vfio.
CPU: Ryzen 1700X
GPU: Sapphire pulse rx 5700 xt
Mobo: Asus Rog strix X370-F
Bios options: SVM : Enabled, SR-IOV : Disabled
OS: arch , kernel 5.2.11-arch1-1-ARCH
Kernel parameters: "amd_iommu=on iommu=pt loglevel=3 quiet"

mkinitcpio.conf (comments are ommited)
MODULES=(vfio_pci vfio vfio_iommu_type1 vfio_virqfd) BINARIES=() FILES=() HOOKS=(base udev autodetect modconf block filesystems keyboard fsck) 
/etc/modprobe.d/vfio.conf
options vfio_pci ids=1002:731f,1002:ab38 
iommu groups
IOMMU Group 0: 00:01.0 Host bridge [0600]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Family 17h (Models 00h-1fh) PCIe Dummy Host Bridge [1022:1452] IOMMU Group 1: 00:01.1 PCI bridge [0604]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Family 17h (Models 00h-0fh) PCIe GPP Bridge [1022:1453] IOMMU Group 10: 00:08.1 PCI bridge [0604]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Family 17h (Models 00h-0fh) Internal PCIe GPP Bridge 0 to Bus B [1022:1454] IOMMU Group 11: 00:14.0 SMBus [0c05]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] FCH SMBus Controller [1022:790b] (rev 59) 00:14.3 ISA bridge [0601]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] FCH LPC Bridge [1022:790e] (rev 51) IOMMU Group 12: 00:18.0 Host bridge [0600]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Family 17h (Models 00h-0fh) Data Fabric: Device 18h; Function 0 [1022:1460] 00:18.1 Host bridge [0600]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Family 17h (Models 00h-0fh) Data Fabric: Device 18h; Function 1 [1022:1461] 00:18.2 Host bridge [0600]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Family 17h (Models 00h-0fh) Data Fabric: Device 18h; Function 2 [1022:1462] 00:18.3 Host bridge [0600]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Family 17h (Models 00h-0fh) Data Fabric: Device 18h; Function 3 [1022:1463] 00:18.4 Host bridge [0600]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Family 17h (Models 00h-0fh) Data Fabric: Device 18h; Function 4 [1022:1464] 00:18.5 Host bridge [0600]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Family 17h (Models 00h-0fh) Data Fabric: Device 18h; Function 5 [1022:1465] 00:18.6 Host bridge [0600]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Family 17h (Models 00h-0fh) Data Fabric: Device 18h; Function 6 [1022:1466] 00:18.7 Host bridge [0600]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Family 17h (Models 00h-0fh) Data Fabric: Device 18h; Function 7 [1022:1467] IOMMU Group 13: 01:00.0 Non-Volatile memory controller [0108]: Samsung Electronics Co Ltd NVMe SSD Controller SM981/PM981/PM983 [144d:a808] IOMMU Group 14: 02:00.0 USB controller [0c03]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] X370 Series Chipset USB 3.1 xHCI Controller [1022:43b9] (rev 02) 02:00.1 SATA controller [0106]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] X370 Series Chipset SATA Controller [1022:43b5] (rev 02) 02:00.2 PCI bridge [0604]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] X370 Series Chipset PCIe Upstream Port [1022:43b0] (rev 02) 03:00.0 PCI bridge [0604]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] 300 Series Chipset PCIe Port [1022:43b4] (rev 02) 03:02.0 PCI bridge [0604]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] 300 Series Chipset PCIe Port [1022:43b4] (rev 02) 03:03.0 PCI bridge [0604]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] 300 Series Chipset PCIe Port [1022:43b4] (rev 02) 03:04.0 PCI bridge [0604]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] 300 Series Chipset PCIe Port [1022:43b4] (rev 02) 03:06.0 PCI bridge [0604]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] 300 Series Chipset PCIe Port [1022:43b4] (rev 02) 03:07.0 PCI bridge [0604]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] 300 Series Chipset PCIe Port [1022:43b4] (rev 02) 04:00.0 USB controller [0c03]: ASMedia Technology Inc. ASM1142 USB 3.1 Host Controller [1b21:1242] 05:00.0 Ethernet controller [0200]: Intel Corporation I211 Gigabit Network Connection [8086:1539] (rev 03) IOMMU Group 15: 0a:00.0 PCI bridge [0604]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD/ATI] Device [1002:1478] (rev c1) IOMMU Group 16: 0b:00.0 PCI bridge [0604]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD/ATI] Device [1002:1479] IOMMU Group 17: 0c:00.0 VGA compatible controller [0300]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD/ATI] Navi 10 [Radeon RX 5700 / 5700 XT] [1002:731f] (rev c1) IOMMU Group 18: 0c:00.1 Audio device [0403]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD/ATI] Navi 10 HDMI Audio [1002:ab38] IOMMU Group 19: 0d:00.0 Non-Essential Instrumentation [1300]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Zeppelin/Raven/Raven2 PCIe Dummy Function [1022:145a] IOMMU Group 2: 00:01.3 PCI bridge [0604]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Family 17h (Models 00h-0fh) PCIe GPP Bridge [1022:1453] IOMMU Group 20: 0d:00.2 Encryption controller [1080]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Family 17h (Models 00h-0fh) Platform Security Processor [1022:1456] IOMMU Group 21: 0d:00.3 USB controller [0c03]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Family 17h (Models 00h-0fh) USB 3.0 Host Controller [1022:145c] IOMMU Group 22: 0e:00.0 Non-Essential Instrumentation [1300]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Zeppelin/Renoir PCIe Dummy Function [1022:1455] IOMMU Group 23: 0e:00.2 SATA controller [0106]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] FCH SATA Controller [AHCI mode] [1022:7901] (rev 51) IOMMU Group 24: 0e:00.3 Audio device [0403]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Family 17h (Models 00h-0fh) HD Audio Controller [1022:1457] IOMMU Group 3: 00:02.0 Host bridge [0600]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Family 17h (Models 00h-1fh) PCIe Dummy Host Bridge [1022:1452] IOMMU Group 4: 00:03.0 Host bridge [0600]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Family 17h (Models 00h-1fh) PCIe Dummy Host Bridge [1022:1452] IOMMU Group 5: 00:03.1 PCI bridge [0604]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Family 17h (Models 00h-0fh) PCIe GPP Bridge [1022:1453] IOMMU Group 6: 00:04.0 Host bridge [0600]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Family 17h (Models 00h-1fh) PCIe Dummy Host Bridge [1022:1452] IOMMU Group 7: 00:07.0 Host bridge [0600]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Family 17h (Models 00h-1fh) PCIe Dummy Host Bridge [1022:1452] IOMMU Group 8: 00:07.1 PCI bridge [0604]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Family 17h (Models 00h-0fh) Internal PCIe GPP Bridge 0 to Bus B [1022:1454] IOMMU Group 9: 00:08.0 Host bridge [0600]: Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. [AMD] Family 17h (Models 00h-1fh) PCIe Dummy Host Bridge [1022:1452] 
xml
 win10 facb7abd-ac3e-4a04-8e86-d6944b62d723      8388608 8388608 16  hvm /usshare/ovmf/x64/OVMF_CODE.fd /valib/libvirt/qemu/nvram/win10_VARS.fd                      destroy restart destroy      /usbin/qemu-system-x86_64     
Output of "dmesg | grep vfio" before starting vm
[ 1.279191] vfio-pci 0000:0c:00.0: vgaarb: changed VGA decodes: olddecodes=io+mem,decodes=io+mem:owns=io+mem [ 1.293682] vfio_pci: add [1002:731f[ffffffff:ffffffff]] class 0x000000/00000000 [ 1.310411] vfio_pci: add [1002:ab38[ffffffff:ffffffff]] class 0x000000/00000000 
full output: https://pastebin.com/UVaxAWWU

Output of "dmesg | grep vfio" after starting vm
[ 1.279191] vfio-pci 0000:0c:00.0: vgaarb: changed VGA decodes: olddecodes=io+mem,decodes=io+mem:owns=io+mem [ 1.293682] vfio_pci: add [1002:731f[ffffffff:ffffffff]] class 0x000000/00000000 [ 1.310411] vfio_pci: add [1002:ab38[ffffffff:ffffffff]] class 0x000000/00000000 [ 358.866916] vfio-pci 0000:0c:00.0: vfio_ecap_init: hiding ecap [email protected] [ 358.866927] vfio-pci 0000:0c:00.0: vfio_ecap_init: hiding ecap [email protected] [ 358.866930] vfio-pci 0000:0c:00.0: vfio_ecap_init: hiding ecap [email protected] [ 358.866931] vfio-pci 0000:0c:00.0: vfio_ecap_init: hiding ecap [email protected] [ 358.866933] vfio-pci 0000:0c:00.0: vfio_ecap_init: hiding ecap [email protected] [ 358.867808] vfio-pci 0000:0c:00.0: BAR 0: can't reserve [mem 0xe0000000-0xefffffff 64bit pref] [ 361.571367] vfio-pci 0000:0c:00.0: No more image in the PCI ROM [ 361.571388] vfio-pci 0000:0c:00.0: No more image in the PCI ROM 
full output: https://pastebin.com/VyxF9Y88

Since I only have one gpu I am forwarding X11 to a laptop and running virt-manager from there, windows starts and works fine but on my main display I only get a blinking cursor after starting the vm.

Edit: Thanks to u/cybervseas and this post https://www.reddit.com/VFIO/comments/7kpw33/cant_passthrough_boot_gpu_did_i_miss_something/ I got the vm working.
I added a line to the xml file that points to the rom file to be used. You can get that file from https://www.techpowerup.com/vgabios/ , download gpu-z and dump it or any other way to get the rom of your gpu.
    
The last thing was changing some settings in grub. I added the kernel parameter 'nofb' and changed GRUB_GFXPAYLOAD from 'keep' to 'text' in the file at /etc/default/grub.
Everything seems to work now I am writing this from inside the vm and I had no problems with the driver installation it works the same way as if windows was the host os.
submitted by diogo464 to VFIO [link] [comments]

Game NCCH and CDN Encryption (an explanation)

Game and CDN Encryption

Overview

There's been a lot of misinformation going around since the Sun/Moon demo's been announced, and I've come to realize people really don't understand how game encryption works on the 3DS.
I'd like to try to correct that.
Please note that the earlier parts of this post have been plagiarized liberally from topkeknosnek's wonderful explanation of the eShop and CDN's encryption.
The parts past CDN encryption are less plagiarized.
(To skip the bits that aren't relevant for physical game cartridges, jump to step 4.)

Overview

Very abstractly spoken, this is what happens when you purchase and download a game from the eShop:
  1. The game is purchased via eShop.
  2. eShop causes the download and installation of the ticket for the title.
  3. 3DS downloads the tmd and CDN contents.
  4. (3a) 3DS decrypts and installs the CDN contents.
  5. (3b) 3DS verifies the SHA-256 hash of the decrypted CDN contents.
You probably barely got any of that, so let's break it down.

Step 1: eShop Title Purchase

First, the game to download needs to be purchased.
Some terminology: eShop games are called "titles". The term "titles" is broader than that, however, and includes every part of the system firmware, such as NATIVE_FIRM or the HOME Menu.
The eShop application on the 3DS ("tiger") sends a request to the eShop server called ninja -- there are multiple eShop servers, but ninja is the relevant one for purchase-related things. In that request, tiger asks for purchase of a certain title.
ninja then verifies whether tiger is actually authenticated and if the associated account has the required balance. If not, an error is returned to tiger. If yes, the purchase is processed and tiger is notified about that. From then on, the respective title is associated with its respective NNID.

Step 2: Ticket Download

Once the eShop has been notified of the successful purchase, it calls the nim system module to download and install the ticket for the purchased title. The nim service is a service in the 3DS's firmware that handles downloading and installing CDN contents, including the firmware itself.

Tickets

A ticket describes a digital entitlement to a certain CDN content. A ticket can be either unique, in which case it contains a console ID and an eShop account ID. Or it can be a cetk (Common E-Ticket), which is valid for all consoles.
Of particular interest in a ticket is the titlekey. The titlekey is an encryption key that is used to decrypt the CDN contents. Guessing it blindly (brute forcing it) is currently considered computationally infeasible.
Furthermore, a ticket contains the amount of times a title can be launched. This is effectively only used for demos. The current amount of times the title can be launched, however, is kept track of by the HOME Menu. For this reason, HANS, regionthree and similar launchers can bypass the demo launch limit.
Tickets are always signed by Nintendo (RSA-2048 over a SHA-256 hash with PKCS#1 padding), meaning they cannot be forged. This signature is also checked every time the title is launched. Finding the private key to the public key is currently considered computationally infeasible.

Step 3: TMDs and Contents

Once the ticket has been installed, nim will then download and install the title. This is done in two steps: Downloading and verifying the TMD, then downloading and verifying the CDN contents.

Step 3a: TMD

First, nim downloads the TMD for a given title.
A TMD (title metadata) contains information about the contents themselves: The number of contents and their respective SHA-256 hashes.
TMDs are always signed by Nintendo (RSA-2048 over a SHA-256 hash with PKCS#1 padding), meaning they cannot be forged.

Step 3b: Contents

Once the TMD has been obtained, nim proceeds to download the contents described in the TMD.
All contents on the CDN have a layer of encryption around them (AES-128-CBC; the IV is the content index as described by the TMD, then 14 bytes of zeroes are appended). This is sometimes called the "outer" encryption because contents themselves can have encryption inside as well.
A content is just an NCCH after decryption. An NCCH is, simply put, something the 3DS can work with: A bundle of resources (CFA, CTR File Archive, such as the digital manuals) or an executable (CXI, CTR eXecutable Image).
While nim downloads, decrypts and installs the contents, it also hashes the contents (SHA-256). Hashing is the process of taking an input of arbitrary length and getting a fixed-length (hopefully unique) number. Finding the file that belongs to a hash, or a different file that has the same hash, is -- for a good hash function -- computationally infeasible. Spoiler: SHA-256 is a good hash function.
If the SHA-256 of any one of the decrypted contents mismatches the hash in the TMD (which is signed), nim fails the installation and removes the partially installed title.

Step 4: NCCH Decryption

As mentioned before, a game consists of one or more NCCH archives, where an NCCH is a special type of archive that the console knows how to work with.
Game decryption consists of validating the NCCH's signatures, and then decrypting its various partitions.
An NCCH generally consists of the following partitions:
The encrypted partitions can, optionally, be stored decrypted instead, but no commercial title would ever elect to make use of that option (for obvious reasons), so I will be assuming NCCHs are always encrypted for the remainder of this post.
It's also worth nothing that the three additional partitions are all optional -- manuals have no Extended Header or ExeFS, for example.

Step 4a: NCCH signature verification

The first 256 bytes of any NCCH consists of an RSA-2048 signature over the SHA-256 hash of the remaining 256-bytes of the header. This signature, as with all RSA-2048 signatures, is computationally infeasible to break, and so verifies the validity of the following header metadata.
Once the NCCH's header has been verified, the system will proceed to read the metadata for the other partitions, and decrypt them to verify their SHA-256 hashes, which are stored in the header.

Step 4b: NCCH partition decryption

NCCH partitions are encrypted with one of (as of October 9th, 2016) five (really six) possible key derivation schemes. Sound confusing? It is. The system originally only had two schemes, but as they were cracked and the system began to be penetrated by homebrew users, Nintendo cooked up new and more complex schemes to prevent unauthorized users from decrypting NCCH contents.
Once the key has been derived, though, NCCH decryption is relatively simple -- each partition is protected by AES-CTR encryption, using the Title ID and Partition type (Extended Header, ExeFS, or RomFS) as a CTInitialization Vector. As such, I'll mostly be focused on explaining the various key derivation schemes, as they're the meat of how NCCH files are protected.

Scheme 0: Fixed-key encryption

The first, and simplest key derivation scheme. Used presumably for testing in the early stages of the 3DS's development and for legacy support, partitions are protected using a key that consists entirely of zeros. This is not very secure, obviously, and so titles that use this encryption method can be easily decrypted on a PC. This isn't really used by anything, but it merits mentioning because it's the key scheme Gateway allowed users to use when they began to allow users to run homebrew from their red cart, way back in the early days of the scene. Scheme 0 is also the type of encryption used by the SDK for testing games on dev units.

Scheme 1: Secure1 encryption

The second key derivation scheme, and the simplest of the ones that do real key derivation. Before I can explain how it works, one should know that the 3DS has a hardware engine devoted to doing AES encryption and decryption which also serves a second purpose as a "Keyscrambler". The keyscrambler, originally introduced with the DSi, allows Nintendo to "mix" two keys together to calculate a third key. The keyscrambler is write-only -- which means that even though you can use the secret keys made by scrambling together two input keys, you can't read them or learn what they are. The hardware engine also has some number of keyslots, each of which is devoted to a particular kind of encryption, so that it can keep track of many mixed-together secret keys without removing access to the others.
Some terminology:
With that out of the way, Secure1 uses a fairly basic method to derive the secret encryption key. The bootrom (the unchangable code that runs early in the console's boot, which locks access to itself away as soon as it's done executing) initializes the 44th (0x2C) keyslot by writing secret data to the KeyX. When an NCCH using Secure1 needs to decrypt one of its partitions, it writes the first 16 bytes from the header's signature to the KeyY, and uses the resulting secret key to decrypt the partition's contents. This is clever, because using part of the signature to calculate the secret key discourages an attacker from trying to modify the signature -- doing so would make the partitions decrypt incorrectly!
Secure1 is a good scheme. That said, when the system was first compromised at the Kernel9 level, Nintendo realized people could decrypt titles and worked to create a new scheme that would keep content safe even with the system itself compromised.

Scheme 2: Secure2 encryption

The third key derivation scheme, introduced with firmware 7.0. Having realized that Secure1 had been compromised due to the 4.5 ARM9 exploits, Nintendo implemented this scheme to prevent content decryption without a new ARM9 exploit on higher firmwares. They accomplished this fairly ingeniously: the bootrom, in addition to initializing the hardware keyslots, initializes some RSA data that went unused, and got overwritten later on during the firmware's bootup process. Nintendo added code that runs early on in the firmware boot that checks whether this RSA data is still present. If so, firmware will perform RSA encryption on some static data, then hash the resulting encrypted data with SHA-256. The second 16 bytes of this SHA-256 hash is then used to initialize the 37th (0x25) keyslot's KeyX, and firmware will overwrite the RSA data to prevent its being used after the system is fully booted up.
Secure2 decryption proceeds much the same way as Secure1, afterwards. The Extended header and ExeFS still largely use keyslot 0x2C for encryption using the Secure1 secret key methodology. However, the ExeFS's code binary and RomFS get special treatment -- they use keyslot 0x25 instead of keyslot 0x2C.
That scheme was, for a while, secure -- the data is already overwritten by the time attackers got ARM9 code execution on 4.0. Since the Extended header, and title's 3D banneicon still use the old form of encryption, to an older system the title will display correctly in the home menu, but when it comes time for the title to launch the game's code and RomFS will fail to decrypt correctly -- and thus Nintendo achieved backwards compatibility while keeping the important bits of a title's content secure and out of the hands of unauthorized users.
However, Gateway got a hold of the data used to initialize keyslot 0x25 somehow. Nobody's actually sure how this happened! Gateway's obtaining the key meant, though, that they included it in their exploit, and it was eventually extracted and leaked to the public by an anonymous user known as "K" on October 25th, 2014. Nintendo's sytem was thus once more insecure -- and so they needed to fix that.

Scheme 3: Secure3 encryption

With the release of the N3DS, Nintendo added a new, N3DS-exclusive encryption method in Secure3. The N3DS, as anyone who uses A9LH will know, added a new 512-byte sector of encrypted secret data to the console's NAND, and a new loader to firmware. This loader decrypted the first 16-bytes of the secret sector using the SHA-256 hash of first 144 bytes from the console's OTP data, initializes a temporary (0x11) keyslot with those first 16-bytes, then locks out access to the OTP. It then verifies the key it read from NAND, uses the temporary keyslot to decrypt some static data to initialize the 21st (0x15) keyslot and other static data to initialize the 24th (0x18) through the 31st (0x1F) keyslots, then uses keyslot 0x15 to decrypt the rest of the N3DS's firmware.
Secure3 encryption works exactly the same as Secure2 encryption, except where Secure2 would use keyslot 0x25, Secure3 uses keyslot 0x18.
This scheme was, once more, seemingly secure -- as far as Nintendo knew, nobody could access the OTP, and thus nobody could decrypt the secret data in NAND to get the new NCCH key. However, Nintendo made a mistake -- the close reader will notice they forgot to clear their temporary keyslot 0x11 after using it, and so once people gained ARM9 code execution on a New 3DS, they could use keyslot 0x11 to decrypt firmware and regenerate the missing keys, once more breaking nintendo's scheme. Nintendo fixed this in their 9.6 update, introducing their next two schemes.

Scheme 4: Secure4 encryption

Introduced in Firmware 9.6.0, Nintendo sought to fix their mistake in Secure3 by using a different set of 16 bytes from the encrypted secret data in NAND to decrypt firmware and calculate further encryption keys. They did this by initializing their temporary keyslot 0x11 with the second 16-bytes from the secret sector the same way they did with the first 16, then lock out the OTP. They then use the temporary keyslot to decrypt some static data to initialize the 22nd (0x16) keyslot and other static data to initialize the 25th (0x19) through the 31st (0x1F) keyslots, then uses keyslot 0x16 to decrypt the rest of the N3DS's firmware (They leave the 24th keyslot initialized the same way as before, to retain compatibility with Secure3-protected titles). They also properly clear their temporary keyslot (0x11) when done.
Secure4 encryption works as Secure3 and Secure2 do, except using keyslot 0x1B in place of 0x18/0x25.
This scheme was secure for a long while. However, people eventually noticed that Nintendo made a fatal flaw in their implementation -- they forgot to verify keyslot 0x16 before using it to decrypt firmware. The secret sector was leaked on pastebin by an anonymous user known as "K" on January 12th, 2016, and, thus, by random brute force or by obtaining OTP, one can replace the key in NAND with a calculated one to gain pre-kernel code access on N3DS or O3DS known usually as "arm9loaderhax", sometimes "kernel9loaderhax", and occasionally to the very stupid as "Gateway Fast-Boot". Arm9loaderhax breaks Secure4 entirely -- and prevents Nintendo from ever using the secret sector again for additional encryption schemes, and from using other miscellaneous bootrom-initialized data. It also enables the user to calculate the key used for Secure2 encryption, though as it was leaked there's not much point to doing this. It also enables some other cool stuff with custom firmware, but from an encryption perspective that's relatively uninteresting and outside of the scope of this post.

Scheme 5: Seed encryption

Introduced alongside Secure4, Seed encryption isn't actually separate from the other schemes! It can be used alongside Secure2, Secure3, or Secure4, as an additional protection layer for certain titles. The motivation behind Seed encryption was that Nintendo wanted to allow users to purchase titles and download them in advance of their release date, but not let users play them before release date arrived. The old encryption methods had no way to support this -- purchasing a title gives its titlekey, which enables decryption, and once a title has been decrypted none of the schemes had any concept of release date protection -- they just use the first 16 bytes NCCH signature mixed with some other secret data (varying by Secure# scheme) to derive the secret key.
Seed encryption fixes this problem. Nintendo added a new server ("kagiya") to their CDN which stores 16-byte "external seeds", also known as "content lock seeds", "ext seeds", "ext keys", and any number of other names. These seeds are unique to each title that uses the encryption scheme. If a title uses seed encryption, then whenever it is launched Nintendo will attempt to retrieve the title's seed from SEEDDB. Failing that, the user will be prompted to download a "small update" from the eShop, which consists of the console trying to retrieve the seed from kagiya, and storing the seed in SEEDDB for future easy access.
Supposing the console succeeds in retrieving the seed from SEEDDB, it will then calculate the SHA256 hash of the first 16 bytes of the NCCH's signature and the 16 byte external seed. If the partition being decrypted would use Secure1's keyslot 0x2C, decryption proceeds per normal. However, if the partition is code or the title's RomFS, the system will instead use this SHA256 hash as the KeyY for whatever keyslot the secondary encryption scheme would use (0x25 for Secure2, 0x18 for Secure3, and 0x1B for Secure4).
This scheme adds no security after a title's release date, but it enables exactly the pre-purchasing behavior Nintendo wanted -- Nintendo can hold off on releasing the external seed for a title until its release date, while allowing users to purchase the title beforehand. Purchasing the title will let users download the title to their console and decrypt the CDN contents with the titlekey -- users can also preview the icon and 3d banner, as they will use the old 0x2C Secure1 encryption. However, because code and RomFS partitions will use a secret key that requires the content seed to calculate, they cannot be accessed prior to release date when Nintendo publishes the title's seed to their Kagiya server.

Practical Impact

All Secure# methods have been broken, at this point. Anyone with a console and arm9loaderhax can make use of the 3ds's hardware AES engine to decrypt content using any of the Secure1/2/3/4 schemes. Further, Nintendo cannot introduce new schemes, as there is no bootrom-initialized data that a future kernel9loader could access that vulnerable versions can't similarly access. Introducing a new scheme would require a new hardware revision, and with the NX on the horizon that seems unlikely to happen.
However, you may notice that Secure2/3/4 use calculated data for their KeyX, whereas Secure1 uses bootrom-initialized data. This means, in practice, that since the 3DS's keyscrambler algorithm was broken at 32c3 by yellows8 and plutoo, we can calculate the scrambled secret keys for those schemes on our PCs without any need for a console. Ironically, this means Secure1 is actually more secure than Secure2/Secure3/Secure4 -- any titles making use of later schemes can have their code and RomFSs be decrypted on PC, but Secure1 can only be decrypted by making use of a hacked 3DS console. Nintendo would actually be better off by no longer using Secure2/3/4, and by switching back exclusively to Secure1, which will remain permanently secure unless the 3DS's bootrom somehow gets dumped.
Further, seed encryption prevents titles from being played ahead of their release dates even if their titlekys are public knowledge. This means that when, for example, Pokemon Sun and Moon become available for prepurchase in the next month, even though their titlekeys will be public and usable with piracy tools the games won't be playable or capable of being decrypted before the official release date.
It is worth nothing, however, seed encryption is for downloadable eShop titles only -- no physical cartridge will ever make use of it.

And a bit of trivia

Even though content lock seeds should never be published ahead of time, Nintendo can be a bit careless with them -- they're fairly often released when they shouldn't be, enabling pre-release date access to some games. The Legend of Zelda: Triforce Heroes, for example, had its content lock seed published a month before its release date, despite being pre-purchasable. This meant that anyone who was paying attention could have been playing that game several weeks in advance, though I don't know that anyone publically exploited this.
submitted by SciresM to 3dshacks [link] [comments]

Adafruit Space Invader pendant. Want to convert to using a bicolor 1.2 led matrix. How would the code change?

 // Trinket/Gemma + LED matrix backpack jewelry. Plays animated // sequence on LED matrix. Press reset button to display again, // or add optional momentary button between pin #1 and +V. // THERE IS NO ANIMATION DATA IN THIS SOURCE FILE, you should // rarely need to change anything here. EDIT anim.h INSTEAD. #define BRIGHTNESS 14 // 0=min, 15=max #define I2C_ADDR 0x70 // Edit if backpack A0/A1 jumpers set #include  #include  #include  #include "anim2.h" // Animation data is located here #include "anim3.h" // Animation data is located here #include "anim4.h" // Animation data is located here static const uint8_t PROGMEM reorder[] = { // Column-reordering table 0x00,0x40,0x20,0x60,0x10,0x50,0x30,0x70,0x08,0x48,0x28,0x68,0x18,0x58,0x38,0x78, 0x04,0x44,0x24,0x64,0x14,0x54,0x34,0x74,0x0c,0x4c,0x2c,0x6c,0x1c,0x5c,0x3c,0x7c, 0x02,0x42,0x22,0x62,0x12,0x52,0x32,0x72,0x0a,0x4a,0x2a,0x6a,0x1a,0x5a,0x3a,0x7a, 0x06,0x46,0x26,0x66,0x16,0x56,0x36,0x76,0x0e,0x4e,0x2e,0x6e,0x1e,0x5e,0x3e,0x7e, 0x01,0x41,0x21,0x61,0x11,0x51,0x31,0x71,0x09,0x49,0x29,0x69,0x19,0x59,0x39,0x79, 0x05,0x45,0x25,0x65,0x15,0x55,0x35,0x75,0x0d,0x4d,0x2d,0x6d,0x1d,0x5d,0x3d,0x7d, 0x03,0x43,0x23,0x63,0x13,0x53,0x33,0x73,0x0b,0x4b,0x2b,0x6b,0x1b,0x5b,0x3b,0x7b, 0x07,0x47,0x27,0x67,0x17,0x57,0x37,0x77,0x0f,0x4f,0x2f,0x6f,0x1f,0x5f,0x3f,0x7f, 0x80,0xc0,0xa0,0xe0,0x90,0xd0,0xb0,0xf0,0x88,0xc8,0xa8,0xe8,0x98,0xd8,0xb8,0xf8, 0x84,0xc4,0xa4,0xe4,0x94,0xd4,0xb4,0xf4,0x8c,0xcc,0xac,0xec,0x9c,0xdc,0xbc,0xfc, 0x82,0xc2,0xa2,0xe2,0x92,0xd2,0xb2,0xf2,0x8a,0xca,0xaa,0xea,0x9a,0xda,0xba,0xfa, 0x86,0xc6,0xa6,0xe6,0x96,0xd6,0xb6,0xf6,0x8e,0xce,0xae,0xee,0x9e,0xde,0xbe,0xfe, 0x81,0xc1,0xa1,0xe1,0x91,0xd1,0xb1,0xf1,0x89,0xc9,0xa9,0xe9,0x99,0xd9,0xb9,0xf9, 0x85,0xc5,0xa5,0xe5,0x95,0xd5,0xb5,0xf5,0x8d,0xcd,0xad,0xed,0x9d,0xdd,0xbd,0xfd, 0x83,0xc3,0xa3,0xe3,0x93,0xd3,0xb3,0xf3,0x8b,0xcb,0xab,0xeb,0x9b,0xdb,0xbb,0xfb, 0x87,0xc7,0xa7,0xe7,0x97,0xd7,0xb7,0xf7,0x8f,0xcf,0xaf,0xef,0x9f,0xdf,0xbf,0xff }; int animationSection = 0; void ledCmd(uint8_t x) { // Issue command to LED backback driver Wire.beginTransmission(I2C_ADDR); Wire.write(x); Wire.endTransmission(); } void clear(void) { // Clear display buffer Wire.beginTransmission(I2C_ADDR); for(uint8_t i=0; i<17; i++) Wire.write(0); Wire.endTransmission(); } void setup() { power_timer1_disable(); // Disable unused peripherals power_adc_disable(); // to save power PCMSK |= _BV(PCINT1); // Set change mask for pin 1 Wire.begin(); // I2C init clear(); // Blank display ledCmd(0x21); // Turn on oscillator ledCmd(0xE0 | BRIGHTNESS); // Set brightness ledCmd(0x81); // Display on, no blink } uint8_t rep = REPS; void loop() { switch (animationSection) { case 0: for(int i=0; i 10) { animationSection = 0; } if(!--rep) { // If last cycle... ledCmd(0x20); // LED matrix in standby mode // GIMSK = _BV(PCIE); // Enable pin change interrupt // power_all_disable(); // All peripherals off // set_sleep_mode(SLEEP_MODE_PWR_DOWN); // sleep_enable(); // sei(); // Keep interrupts disabled // sleep_mode(); // Power down CPU (pin 1 will wake) // Execution resumes here on wake. // PLD - Simply Sleep for 2 minutes then start again... //delay(100000); //delay(100000); delay(120000); animationSection = 0; GIMSK = 0; // Disable pin change interrupt rep = REPS; // Reset animation counter power_timer0_enable(); // Re-enable timer power_usi_enable(); // Re-enable USI Wire.begin(); // Re-init I2C clear(); // Blank display ledCmd(0x21); // Re-enable matrix } } ISR(PCINT0_vect) {} // Button tap 
This is a section of the anim file. I want to be able to set the various colors in these "frames"
// Animation data for Trinket/Gemma + LED matrix backpack jewelry. // Edit this file to change the animation; it's unlikely you'll need // to edit the source code. #define REPS 10 // Number of times to repeat the animation loop (1-255) const int frameSpeed2 = 3; const uint8_t PROGMEM anim2[] = { // Animation bitmaps. Each frame of animation MUST contain // 8 lines of graphics data (there is no error checking for // length). Each line should be prefixed with the letter 'B', // followed by exactly 8 binary digits (0 or 1), no more, // no less (again, no error checking). '0' represents an // 'off' pixel, '1' an 'on' pixel. End line with a comma. B00000000, B00000000, B00000000, B00000000, B00000000, B00000000, B00000000, B00000000, frameSpeed2, // 0.10 seconds }; 
submitted by pldiguanaman to arduino [link] [comments]

[Question] Springboard keeps crashing since BackupAZ restore, need help deciphering crash log.

Since I restored all my tweaks from iOS 8.3 to iOS 8.4, I was never able to respring. I use a tweak that gives crash logs on crashes and I have one here, but can't really figure out what the problem is. Please someone help me out with this, thanks.
{"bug_type":"109","os_version":"iPhone OS 8.4 (12H143)","build_version":"50","symbolicated":true,"blame":[],"app_name":"SpringBoard","bundleID":"com.apple.springboard","name":"SpringBoard","is_first_party":false,"app_version":"1.0","share_with_app_devs":false,"slice_uuid":"3860cf62-2f89-39c1-ac0b-391067289ec0","adam_id":0} Incident Identifier: 0C393959-D99A-407F-8D6C-AB0E681CEEB1 CrashReporter Key: 89fbb672d1931c06d7957501ce6e19f2cef9b0c8 Hardware Model: iPad3,4 Process: SpringBoard [2333] Path: /System/Library/CoreServices/SpringBoard.app/SpringBoard Identifier: com.apple.springboard Version: 50 (1.0) Code Type: ARM (Native) Parent Process: launchd [1] Date/Time: 2015-07-01 22:11:07.592 -0400 Launch Time: 2015-07-01 22:10:55.080 -0400 OS Version: iOS 8.4 (12H143) Report Version: 105 Exception Type: EXC_CRASH (SIGABRT) Exception Codes: 0x0000000000000000, 0x0000000000000000 Triggered by Thread: 0
Last Exception Backtrace: 0 CoreFoundation 0x2947efea 0x29377000 + 0x107fea // exceptionPreprocess + 0x7a 1 libobjc.A.dylib 0x37b3cc86 0x37b36000 + 0x6c86 // objc_exception_throw + 0x22 2 CoreFoundation 0x2947eec0 0x29377000 + 0x107ec0 // +[NSException raise:format:arguments:] + 0x64 3 Foundation 0x2a17ef12 0x2a0ee000 + 0x90f12 // -[NSAssertionHandler handleFailureInMethod:object:file:lineNumber:description:] + 0x56 4 SpringBoard () 0x001bf968 0x00023000 + 0x19c968 // 0x0019c7d4 + 0x194 5 SpringBoard () 0x00210e32 0x00023000 + 0x1ede32 // +[SBIconLabelImage _drawLabelImageForParameters:] + 0x235 6 SpringBoard () 0x0021c296 0x00023000 + 0x1f9296 // -[SBCountedMap checkoutValueForKey:creationBlock:] + 0x89 7 SpringBoard () 0x0021119c 0x00023000 + 0x1ee19c // +[SBIconLabelImage checkoutLabelImageForParameters:] + 0x73 8 SpringBoard () 0x00153bde 0x00023000 + 0x130bde // +[SBIconLabelView updateIconLabelView:withSettings:imageParameters:] + 0x85 9 SpringBoard () 0x001886be 0x00023000 + 0x1656be // -[SBIconView _updateLabel] + 0x81 10 SpringBoard () 0x00187496 0x00023000 + 0x164496 // -[SBIconView _setIcon:animated:] + 0x95 11 SpringBoard () 0x0018fca8 0x00023000 + 0x16cca8 // -[SBIconViewMap _iconViewForIcon:] + 0xd7 12 SpringBoard () 0x0018fd04 0x00023000 + 0x16cd04 // -[SBIconViewMap iconViewForIcon:] + 0x4b 13 SpringBoard () 0x000abf96 0x00023000 + 0x88f96 // -[SBIconListView showIconImagesFromColumn:toColumn:totalColumns:allowAnimations:] + 0x1c1 14 SpringBoard () 0x002ea682 0x00023000 + 0x2c7682 // -[SBFolderView updateIconListIndexAndVisibility:] + 0x5ad 15 SpringBoard () 0x002e9136 0x00023000 + 0x2c6136 // -[SBFolderView _addIconListViewsForModels:] + 0xf9 16 SpringBoard () 0x002c146a 0x00023000 + 0x29e46a // -[SBRootFolderView resetIconListViews] + 0x25 17 SpringBoard () 0x00306970 0x00023000 + 0x2e3970 // -[SBFolderController _resetIconLists] + 0x1f 18 SpringBoard () 0x00305cb6 0x00023000 + 0x2e2cb6 // -[SBFolderController initWithFolder:orientation:viewMap:context:] + 0x139 19 SpringBoard () 0x00305b72 0x00023000 + 0x2e2b72 // -[SBFolderController initWithFolder:orientation:viewMap:] + 0x19 20 SpringBoard () 0x000c3d04 0x00023000 + 0xa0d04 // -[SBRootFolderController initWithFolder:orientation:viewMap:] + 0x2b 21 SpringBoard () 0x000e0800 0x00023000 + 0xbd800 // -[SBIconController _resetRootIconLists] + 0xa7 22 CoreFoundation 0x29436e04 0x29377000 + 0xbfe04 // __CFNOTIFICATIONCENTER_IS_CALLING_OUT_TO_AN_OBSERVER + 0x8 23 CoreFoundation 0x29391510 0x29377000 + 0x1a510 // CFXNotificationPost + 0x6f4 24 Foundation 0x2a0f3744 0x2a0ee000 + 0x5744 // -[NSNotificationCenter postNotificationName:object:userInfo:] + 0x44 25 SpringBoard () 0x000ec7b2 0x00023000 + 0xc97b2 // -[SBIconModel layout] + 0x179 26 SpringBoard () 0x000e5d48 0x00023000 + 0xc2d48 // -[SBIconController relayout] + 0x9f 27 SpringBoard (*) 0x000e0c32 0x00023000 + 0xbdc32 // -[SBIconController _iconVisibilityChanged:] + 0x281 28 CoreFoundation 0x29436e04 0x29377000 + 0xbfe04 // __CFNOTIFICATIONCENTER_IS_CALLING_OUT_TO_AN_OBSERVER_ + 0x8 29 CoreFoundation 0x29391510 0x29377000 + 0x1a510 // CFXNotificationPost + 0x6f4 30 Foundation 0x2a0f3744 0x2a0ee000 + 0x5744 // -[NSNotificationCenter postNotificationName:object:userInfo:] + 0x44 31 SpringBoard () 0x000e9916 0x00023000 + 0xc6916 // -[SBIconModel _postIconVisibilityChangedNotificationShowing:hiding:] + 0xd5 32 SpringBoard () 0x000e9f5e 0x00023000 + 0xc6f5e // -[SBIconModel setVisibilityOfIconsWithVisibleTags:hiddenTags:] + 0x625 33 SpringBoard () 0x002e25c8 0x00023000 + 0x2bf5c8 // -[SBApplicationRestrictionController _postRestrictionStateToObservers:] + 0x167 34 SpringBoard () 0x0002e5ea 0x00023000 + 0xb5ea // -[SpringBoard applicationDidFinishLaunching:] + 0xa99 35 UIKit 0x2cb672ea 0x2caec000 + 0x7b2ea // -[UIApplication _handleDelegateCallbacksWithOptions:isSuspended:restoreState:] + 0x21e 36 UIKit 0x2cd5df44 0x2caec000 + 0x271f44 // -[UIApplication _callInitializationDelegatesForMainScene:transitionContext:] + 0xdf8 37 UIKit 0x2cd60194 0x2caec000 + 0x274194 // -[UIApplication _runWithMainScene:transitionContext:completion:] + 0x580 38 UIKit 0x2cd6ae14 0x2caec000 + 0x27ee14 // __84-[UIApplication _handleApplicationActivationWithScene:transitionContext:completion:]_block_invoke + 0x20 39 UIKit 0x2cd5e936 0x2caec000 + 0x272936 // -[UIApplication workspaceDidEndTransaction:] + 0x7e 40 FrontBoardServices 0x2ff4bec4 0x2ff36000 + 0x15ec4 // __31-[FBSSerialQueue performAsync:]_block_invoke_2 + 0xc 41 CoreFoundation 0x29444fd0 0x29377000 + 0xcdfd0 // __CFRUNLOOP_IS_CALLING_OUT_TO_A_BLOCK_ + 0x8 42 CoreFoundation 0x29444294 0x29377000 + 0xcd294 // __CFRunLoopDoBlocks + 0xd4 43 CoreFoundation 0x29442a32 0x29377000 + 0xcba32 // __CFRunLoopRun + 0x312 44 CoreFoundation 0x2938f1fc 0x29377000 + 0x181fc // CFRunLoopRunSpecific + 0x1d8 45 CoreFoundation 0x2938f00e 0x29377000 + 0x1800e // CFRunLoopRunInMode + 0x66 46 GraphicsServices 0x30d4e1fc 0x30d45000 + 0x91fc // GSEventRunModal + 0x84 47 UIKit 0x2cb5ba04 0x2caec000 + 0x6fa04 // UIApplicationMain + 0x59c 48 SpringBoard (*) 0x0002b296 0x00023000 + 0x8296 // 0x00007ae8 + 0x7ae 49 libdyld.dylib 0x380eeaaa 0x380ed000 + 0x1aaa // tlv_initializer + 0x2
Thread 0 name: Dispatch queue: com.apple.main-thread Thread 0 Crashed: 0 libsystemkernel.dylib 0x381b8df0 0x381a4000 + 0x14df0 // __pthread_kill + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38237cc2 0x38234000 + 0x3cc2 // pthread_kill + 0x3a 2 libsystem_c.dylib 0x38154904 0x3810a000 + 0x4a904 // abort + 0x48 3 libc++abi.dylib 0x3745a9c4 0x3745a000 + 0x9c4 // abort_message + 0x54 4 libc++abi.dylib 0x3747466c 0x3745a000 + 0x1a66c // default_terminate_handler() + 0x108 5 libobjc.A.dylib 0x37b3cf22 0x37b36000 + 0x6f22 // _objc_terminate() + 0xbe 6 libc++abi.dylib 0x37471de0 0x3745a000 + 0x17de0 // std::_terminate(void ()()) + 0x4c 7 libc++abi.dylib 0x374718aa 0x3745a000 + 0x178aa // __cxa_rethrow + 0x62 8 libobjc.A.dylib 0x37b3cdce 0x37b36000 + 0x6dce // objc_exception_rethrow + 0x26 9 CoreFoundation 0x2938f298 0x29377000 + 0x18298 // CFRunLoopRunSpecific + 0x274 10 CoreFoundation 0x2938f00e 0x29377000 + 0x1800e // CFRunLoopRunInMode + 0x66 11 GraphicsServices 0x30d4e1fc 0x30d45000 + 0x91fc // GSEventRunModal + 0x84 12 UIKit 0x2cb5ba04 0x2caec000 + 0x6fa04 // UIApplicationMain + 0x59c 13 SpringBoard () 0x0002b296 0x00023000 + 0x8296 // 0x00007ae8 + 0x7ae 14 libdyld.dylib 0x380eeaac 0x380ed000 + 0x1aac // start + 0x0
Thread 1 name: Dispatch queue: com.apple.libdispatch-manager Thread 1: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381a5224 0x381a4000 + 0x1224 // kevent64 + 0x18 1 libdispatch.dylib 0x380da0ec 0x380cc000 + 0xe0ec // _dispatch_mgr_invoke + 0x114 2 libdispatch.dylib 0x380ced36 0x380cc000 + 0x2d36 // _dispatch_mgr_thread + 0x22
Thread 2: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 3: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 4: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 5: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 6: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 7: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 8 name: Dispatch queue: FBSSerialQueue Thread 8: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381a54c4 0x381a4000 + 0x14c4 // semaphore_wait_trap + 0x8 1 libdispatch.dylib 0x380d85da 0x380cc000 + 0xc5da // _dispatch_semaphore_wait_slow + 0xba 2 FrontBoardServices 0x2ff4bea6 0x2ff36000 + 0x15ea6 // __31-[FBSSerialQueue performAsync:]_block_invoke + 0x8e 3 libdispatch.dylib 0x380cd2e0 0x380cc000 + 0x12e0 // _dispatch_call_block_and_release + 0x8 4 libdispatch.dylib 0x380d5724 0x380cc000 + 0x9724 // _dispatch_queue_drain + 0x5b8 5 libdispatch.dylib 0x380cfaa8 0x380cc000 + 0x3aa8 // _dispatch_queue_invoke + 0x50 6 libdispatch.dylib 0x380d6f9c 0x380cc000 + 0xaf9c // _dispatch_root_queue_drain + 0x188 7 libdispatch.dylib 0x380d83be 0x380cc000 + 0xc3be // _dispatch_worker_thread3 + 0x5a 8 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234dbe 0x38234000 + 0xdbe // _pthread_wqthread + 0x29a 9 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 9: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 10: 0 libsystemkernel.dylib 0x381a5474 0x381a4000 + 0x1474 // mach_msg_trap + 0x14 1 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381a5268 0x381a4000 + 0x1268 // mach_msg + 0x24 2 CoreFoundation 0x2944456e 0x29377000 + 0xcd56e // __CFRunLoopServiceMachPort + 0x8e 3 CoreFoundation 0x29442b14 0x29377000 + 0xcbb14 // __CFRunLoopRun + 0x3f4 4 CoreFoundation 0x2938f1fc 0x29377000 + 0x181fc // CFRunLoopRunSpecific + 0x1d8 5 CoreFoundation 0x2938f00e 0x29377000 + 0x1800e // CFRunLoopRunInMode + 0x66 6 Foundation 0x2a0f9138 0x2a0ee000 + 0xb138 // -[NSRunLoop(NSRunLoop) runMode:beforeDate:] + 0x104 7 Foundation 0x2a147220 0x2a0ee000 + 0x59220 // -[NSRunLoop(NSRunLoop) run] + 0x4c 8 UIKit 0x2cfbfaa0 0x2caec000 + 0x4d3aa0 // -[UIStatusBarServerThread main] + 0x2c0 9 Foundation 0x2a1be3b6 0x2a0ee000 + 0xd03b6 // __NSThreadmain_ + 0x45a 10 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38236e20 0x38234000 + 0x2e20 // _pthread_body + 0x88 11 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38236d92 0x38234000 + 0x2d92 // _pthread_start + 0x72 12 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b1c 0x38234000 + 0xb1c // thread_start + 0x4
Thread 11 name: com.apple.coremedia.player.async Thread 11: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381a54c4 0x381a4000 + 0x14c4 // semaphore_wait_trap + 0x8 1 libdispatch.dylib 0x380d85da 0x380cc000 + 0xc5da // _dispatch_semaphore_wait_slow + 0xba 2 MediaToolbox 0x2af08062 0x2af03000 + 0x5062 // fpa_AsyncMovieControlThread + 0x7aa 3 CoreMedia 0x29beedc8 0x29bbf000 + 0x2fdc8 // figThreadMain + 0xb8 4 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38236e20 0x38234000 + 0x2e20 // _pthread_body + 0x88 5 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38236d92 0x38234000 + 0x2d92 // _pthread_start + 0x72 6 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b1c 0x38234000 + 0xb1c // thread_start + 0x4
Thread 12: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 13: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 14 name: CommonUtilities-WiFi-Thread Thread 14: 0 libsystemkernel.dylib 0x381a5474 0x381a4000 + 0x1474 // mach_msg_trap + 0x14 1 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381a5268 0x381a4000 + 0x1268 // mach_msg + 0x24 2 CoreFoundation 0x2944456e 0x29377000 + 0xcd56e // __CFRunLoopServiceMachPort + 0x8e 3 CoreFoundation 0x29442b14 0x29377000 + 0xcbb14 // __CFRunLoopRun + 0x3f4 4 CoreFoundation 0x2938f1fc 0x29377000 + 0x181fc // CFRunLoopRunSpecific + 0x1d8 5 CoreFoundation 0x293d7f1e 0x29377000 + 0x60f1e // CFRunLoopRun + 0x5e 6 CommonUtilities 0x2ec258d8 0x2ec20000 + 0x58d8 // 0x000057dc + 0xfc 7 Foundation 0x2a1be3b6 0x2a0ee000 + 0xd03b6 // __NSThreadmain_ + 0x45a 8 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38236e20 0x38234000 + 0x2e20 // _pthread_body + 0x88 9 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38236d92 0x38234000 + 0x2d92 // _pthread_start + 0x72 10 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b1c 0x38234000 + 0xb1c // thread_start + 0x4
Thread 15: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381a5474 0x381a4000 + 0x1474 // mach_msg_trap + 0x14 1 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381a5268 0x381a4000 + 0x1268 // mach_msg + 0x24 2 CoreFoundation 0x2944456e 0x29377000 + 0xcd56e // __CFRunLoopServiceMachPort + 0x8e 3 CoreFoundation 0x29442b14 0x29377000 + 0xcbb14 // __CFRunLoopRun + 0x3f4 4 CoreFoundation 0x2938f1fc 0x29377000 + 0x181fc // CFRunLoopRunSpecific + 0x1d8 5 CoreFoundation 0x293d7f1e 0x29377000 + 0x60f1e // CFRunLoopRun + 0x5e 6 CoreMotion 0x29ca384e 0x29c5e000 + 0x4584e // 0x00045584 + 0x2ca 7 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38236e20 0x38234000 + 0x2e20 // _pthread_body + 0x88 8 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38236d92 0x38234000 + 0x2d92 // _pthread_start + 0x72 9 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b1c 0x38234000 + 0xb1c // thread_start + 0x4
Thread 16 name: NetworkLoad Thread 16: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381a5474 0x381a4000 + 0x1474 // mach_msg_trap + 0x14 1 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381a5268 0x381a4000 + 0x1268 // mach_msg + 0x24 2 CoreFoundation 0x2944456e 0x29377000 + 0xcd56e // __CFRunLoopServiceMachPort + 0x8e 3 CoreFoundation 0x29442b14 0x29377000 + 0xcbb14 // __CFRunLoopRun + 0x3f4 4 CoreFoundation 0x2938f1fc 0x29377000 + 0x181fc // CFRunLoopRunSpecific + 0x1d8 5 CoreFoundation 0x2938f00e 0x29377000 + 0x1800e // CFRunLoopRunInMode + 0x66 6 GeoServices 0x30c4dce0 0x30a82000 + 0x1cbce0 // _runNetworkThread + 0x1d0 7 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38236e20 0x38234000 + 0x2e20 // _pthread_body + 0x88 8 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38236d92 0x38234000 + 0x2d92 // _pthread_start + 0x72 9 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b1c 0x38234000 + 0xb1c // thread_start + 0x4
Thread 17: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381a5474 0x381a4000 + 0x1474 // mach_msg_trap + 0x14 1 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381a5268 0x381a4000 + 0x1268 // mach_msg + 0x24 2 CoreFoundation 0x2944456e 0x29377000 + 0xcd56e // __CFRunLoopServiceMachPort + 0x8e 3 CoreFoundation 0x29442b14 0x29377000 + 0xcbb14 // __CFRunLoopRun + 0x3f4 4 CoreFoundation 0x2938f1fc 0x29377000 + 0x181fc // CFRunLoopRunSpecific + 0x1d8 5 CoreFoundation 0x2938f00e 0x29377000 + 0x1800e // CFRunLoopRunInMode + 0x66 6 SpringBoard (*) 0x00092e64 0x00023000 + 0x6fe64 // 0x0006fd78 + 0xec 7 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38236e20 0x38234000 + 0x2e20 // _pthread_body + 0x88 8 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38236d92 0x38234000 + 0x2d92 // _pthread_start + 0x72 9 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b1c 0x38234000 + 0xb1c // thread_start + 0x4
Thread 18 name: com.apple.springboard.icongeneration Thread 18: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381a5474 0x381a4000 + 0x1474 // mach_msg_trap + 0x14 1 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381a5268 0x381a4000 + 0x1268 // mach_msg + 0x24 2 CoreFoundation 0x2944456e 0x29377000 + 0xcd56e // __CFRunLoopServiceMachPort + 0x8e 3 CoreFoundation 0x29442b14 0x29377000 + 0xcbb14 // __CFRunLoopRun + 0x3f4 4 CoreFoundation 0x2938f1fc 0x29377000 + 0x181fc // CFRunLoopRunSpecific + 0x1d8 5 CoreFoundation 0x2938f00e 0x29377000 + 0x1800e // CFRunLoopRunInMode + 0x66 6 SpringBoard (*) 0x00092f84 0x00023000 + 0x6ff84 // 0x0006fe90 + 0xf4 7 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38236e20 0x38234000 + 0x2e20 // _pthread_body + 0x88 8 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38236d92 0x38234000 + 0x2d92 // _pthread_start + 0x72 9 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b1c 0x38234000 + 0xb1c // thread_start + 0x4
Thread 19 name: Dispatch queue: BBDataProviderQueue:com.apple.reminders Thread 19: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381a54c4 0x381a4000 + 0x14c4 // semaphore_wait_trap + 0x8 1 libsystem_platform.dylib 0x38231430 0x3822f000 + 0x2430 // _os_semaphore_wait + 0x8 2 libdispatch.dylib 0x380cdfce 0x380cc000 + 0x1fce // dispatch_once_f + 0xfa 3 EventKit 0x29ef682e 0x29e81000 + 0x7582e // +[_EKAlarmEngine sharedInstance] + 0x26 4 CalendarProvider 0x27bcdc50 0x27bbb000 + 0x12c50 // -[EKBBDataProvider dataProviderDidLoad] + 0x188 5 CalendarProvider 0x27bc7e5a 0x27bbb000 + 0xce5a // -[EKBBReminderProvider dataProviderDidLoad] + 0x2a 6 libdispatch.dylib 0x380cd2e0 0x380cc000 + 0x12e0 // _dispatch_call_block_and_release + 0x8 7 libdispatch.dylib 0x380d5724 0x380cc000 + 0x9724 // _dispatch_queue_drain + 0x5b8 8 libdispatch.dylib 0x380cfaa8 0x380cc000 + 0x3aa8 // _dispatch_queue_invoke + 0x50 9 libdispatch.dylib 0x380d6f9c 0x380cc000 + 0xaf9c // _dispatch_root_queue_drain + 0x188 10 libdispatch.dylib 0x380d83be 0x380cc000 + 0xc3be // _dispatch_worker_thread3 + 0x5a 11 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234dbe 0x38234000 + 0xdbe // _pthread_wqthread + 0x29a 12 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 20 name: Dispatch queue: BBDataProviderQueue:com.apple.mobilecal Thread 20: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381a54c4 0x381a4000 + 0x14c4 // semaphore_wait_trap + 0x8 1 libsystem_platform.dylib 0x38231430 0x3822f000 + 0x2430 // _os_semaphore_wait + 0x8 2 libdispatch.dylib 0x380d47fa 0x380cc000 + 0x87fa // _dispatch_barrier_sync_f_slow + 0x166 3 EventKit 0x29ef6bf4 0x29e81000 + 0x75bf4 // -[_EKAlarmEngine start] + 0x288 4 libdispatch.dylib 0x380cd2cc 0x380cc000 + 0x12cc // _dispatch_client_callout + 0x14 5 libdispatch.dylib 0x380cdf0e 0x380cc000 + 0x1f0e // dispatch_once_f + 0x3a 6 EventKit 0x29ef682e 0x29e81000 + 0x7582e // +[_EKAlarmEngine sharedInstance] + 0x26 7 CalendarProvider 0x27bcdc50 0x27bbb000 + 0x12c50 // -[EKBBDataProvider dataProviderDidLoad] + 0x188 8 CalendarProvider 0x27bc0c96 0x27bbb000 + 0x5c96 // -[EKBBEventProvider dataProviderDidLoad] + 0x2a 9 libdispatch.dylib 0x380cd2e0 0x380cc000 + 0x12e0 // _dispatch_call_block_and_release + 0x8 10 libdispatch.dylib 0x380d5724 0x380cc000 + 0x9724 // _dispatch_queue_drain + 0x5b8 11 libdispatch.dylib 0x380cfaa8 0x380cc000 + 0x3aa8 // _dispatch_queue_invoke + 0x50 12 libdispatch.dylib 0x380d6f9c 0x380cc000 + 0xaf9c // _dispatch_root_queue_drain + 0x188 13 libdispatch.dylib 0x380d83be 0x380cc000 + 0xc3be // _dispatch_worker_thread3 + 0x5a 14 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234dbe 0x38234000 + 0xdbe // _pthread_wqthread + 0x29a 15 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 21: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 22: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 23: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 24: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 25: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 26: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 27: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 28: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 29: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 30: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 31: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 32: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 33: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 34: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 35: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 36: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 37: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 38: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 39: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 40: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 41: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 42: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 43: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 44: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 45: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 46: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 47: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 48: 0 libsystem_kernel.dylib 0x381b99c0 0x381a4000 + 0x159c0 // __workq_kernreturn + 0x8 1 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234e38 0x38234000 + 0xe38 // _pthread_wqthread + 0x314 2 libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x38234b10 0x38234000 + 0xb10 // start_wqthread + 0x4
Thread 0 crashed with ARM Thread State (32-bit): r0: 0x00000000 r1: 0x00000000 r2: 0x00000000 r3: 0x00000003 r4: 0x00000006 r5: 0x3aad39dc r6: 0x3aabf840 r7: 0x00668418 r8: 0x15d776e0 r9: 0x00000000 r10: 0x3aabe074 r11: 0x15d77704 ip: 0x00000148 sp: 0x0066840c lr: 0x38237cc7 pc: 0x381b8df0 cpsr: 0x00000010
Binary Images (dpkg): 0x00669000 - 0x00669fff + MobileSubstrate.dylib armv6 /Library/MobileSubstrate/MobileSubstrate.dylib {"name":"Cydia Substrate","identifier":"mobilesubstrate","version":"0.9.5101","install_date":"2015-07-01 19:03:59 -0400"} 0x006ca000 - 0x006cbfff + SubstrateLoader.dylib armv6 /Library/Frameworks/CydiaSubstrate.framework/Libraries/SubstrateLoader.dylib {"name":"Cydia Substrate","identifier":"mobilesubstrate","version":"0.9.5101","install_date":"2015-07-01 19:03:59 -0400"} 0x006ee000 - 0x006fcfff + Activator.dylib armv7s /Library/MobileSubstrate/DynamicLibraries/Activator.dylib {"name":"Activator","identifier":"libactivator","version":"1.9.3","install_date":"2015-07-01 19:04:02 -0400"} 0x00744000 - 0x00788fff + ActivatorSpringBoard armv6 <7329909f787d3fe18c9a1c391a5ca073> /Library/ActivatoActivatorSpringBoard.bundle/ActivatorSpringBoard {"name":"Activator","identifier":"libactivator","version":"1.9.3","install_date":"2015-07-01 19:04:02 -0400"} 0x007a2000 - 0x007a4fff + librocketbootstrap.dylib armv7s /uslib/librocketbootstrap.dylib {"name":"RocketBootstrap","identifier":"com.rpetrich.rocketbootstrap","version":"1.0.2","install_date":"2015-07-01 19:04:01 -0400"} 0x007a8000 - 0x007abfff + libsubstrate.dylib armv7 <4ff1188b003a3544803dbbf25513e373> /uslib/libsubstrate.dylib {"name":"Cydia Substrate","identifier":"mobilesubstrate","version":"0.9.5101","install_date":"2015-07-01 19:03:59 -0400"} 0x007bc000 - 0x007c4fff + AppList.dylib armv7s <1bf41c4fd65938a39fe7c2f99caef05f> /Library/MobileSubstrate/DynamicLibraries/AppList.dylib {"name":"AppList","identifier":"applist","version":"1.5.9","install_date":"2015-07-01 19:04:03 -0400"} 0x007cb000 - 0x007ecfff + Cylinder.dylib armv7 <65513e33302f346cb29ea6466a625276> /Library/MobileSubstrate/DynamicLibraries/Cylinder.dylib {"name":"Cylinder","identifier":"com.r333d.cylinder","version":"1.0.3","install_date":"2015-07-01 19:04:36 -0400"} 0x007f9000 - 0x007f9fff + IneffectivePower.dylib armv7s <321ee129c6b83c379f7285ee689166a6> /Library/MobileSubstrate/DynamicLibraries/IneffectivePower.dylib {"name":"IneffectivePower","identifier":"net.angelxwind.ineffectivepower","version":"1.2.4-1","install_date":"2015-07-01 19:04:02 -0400"} 0x02320000 - 0x0232bfff + DisplayRecorder.dylib armv7 <3e19c97eed8236a99dc254402027164a> /Library/MobileSubstrate/DynamicLibraries/DisplayRecorder.dylib {"name":"Display Recorder","identifier":"com.booleanmagic.displayrecorder","version":"1.3.16","install_date":"2015-07-01 19:04:04 -0400"} 0x02330000 - 0x0236ffff + Flex.dylib armv7 /Library/MobileSubstrate/DynamicLibraries/Flex.dylib {"name":"Flex 2","identifier":"com.hackyouriphone.flex2","version":"1.970k","install_date":"2015-07-01 19:04:27 -0400"} 0x023a8000 - 0x023b0fff + Flipswitch.dylib armv7s <7d534661710e304a8f1a2d8cfa46a4f2> /Library/MobileSubstrate/DynamicLibraries/Flipswitch.dylib {"name":"Flipswitch","identifier":"com.a3tweaks.flipswitch","version":"1.0.6","install_date":"2015-07-01 19:04:01 -0400"} 0x023b6000 - 0x023bcfff + libFlipswitchSpringBoard.dylib armv6 /Library/Flipswitch/libFlipswitchSpringBoard.dylib {"name":"Flipswitch","identifier":"com.a3tweaks.flipswitch","version":"1.0.6","install_date":"2015-07-01 19:04:01 -0400"} 0x023c3000 - 0x023c8fff + LocalIAPStore.dylib armv7s /Library/MobileSubstrate/DynamicLibraries/LocalIAPStore.dylib {"name":"LocalIAPStore","identifier":"com.hackyouriphone.localiapstore","version":"1.4-1","install_date":"2015-07-01 19:04:32 -0400"} 0x023d2000 - 0x023ddfff + Slide2Kill8Pro.dylib armv7 /Library/MobileSubstrate/DynamicLibraries/Slide2Kill8Pro.dylib {"name":"Slide2Kill8 Pro","identifier":"com.hackyouriphone.slide2kill8pro","version":"1.1-8","install_date":"2015-07-01 19:04:32 -0400"} 0x023e3000 - 0x023ecfff + Springtomize3.dylib armv7s /Library/MobileSubstrate/DynamicLibraries/Springtomize3.dylib {"name":"Springtomize 3 (iOS 7 & 8)","identifier":"com.hackyouriphone.springtomize3","version":"1.3.0-6","install_date":"2015-07-01 19:04:33 -0400"} 0x023f2000 - 0x023fafff + libst3.dylib armv7s <97019929c33c33d0b6eb813c51432219> /uslib/libst3.dylib {"name":"Springtomize 3 (iOS 7 & 8)","identifier":"com.hackyouriphone.springtomize3","version":"1.3.0-6","install_date":"2015-07-01 19:04:33 -0400"} 0x02405000 - 0x02418fff + libst3UI.dylib armv7s /uslib/libst3UI.dylib {"name":"Springtomize 3 (iOS 7 & 8)","identifier":"com.hackyouriphone.springtomize3","version":"1.3.0-6","install_date":"2015-07-01 19:04:33 -0400"} 0x0242e000 - 0x0244bfff + VideoPane.dylib armv7 /Library/MobileSubstrate/DynamicLibraries/VideoPane.dylib {"name":"VideoPane","identifier":"com.rpetrich.videopane","version":"1.1.5","install_date":"2015-07-01 19:04:36 -0400"} 0x024d4000 - 0x024d5fff + Wave.dylib armv7 <2b1fb7d5ce2c3b898574888e80641849> /Library/MobileSubstrate/DynamicLibraries/Wave.dylib {"name":"Wave","identifier":"com.broganminer.wave","version":"1.0.1-1","install_date":"2015-07-01 19:04:01 -0400"}
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TP-Link Archer A7/C7 - Unauthenticated LAN Remote Code Execution (Metasploit). CVE-2020-10884CVE-2020-10883CVE-2020-10882 . remote exploit for Linux_MIPS platform Anyway, going back to nL and nW, for your case, you have an image with width 576, if we convert 576 to Binary, we get two bytes which would go like: 0000 0010 0100 0000. In this case, the Low Byte is 0100 0000 while the High Byte is 0000 0010. Convert it back to decimal and we get nL = 64 and nH = 2. As of SQL Server 2019 CTP 3.0, the single binary UTF-8 collation is: Latin1_General_100_BIN2_UTF8. The reason that there’s only one binary UTF-8 collation is because the Code Page is the same across all UTF-8 collations: 65001. Without a change in Code Page value across cultures, there is then absolutely no difference between binary ... Billig Kaufen Bedburg (North Rhine-Westphalia) Monday, 6 March 2017. 0x25 Binary Optionen the percentage sign, ASCII value hex 0x25 $ the dollar sign, ASCII value hex 0x24 @ the at sign, ASCII value hex 0x40 ~ the tilde or approx sign, ASCII value hex 0x7E: These prefix signs cannot be used interchangeably but are particular to the command string which follows. Address: The ASCII protocol was first introduced in the 1980s by Analog Devices with its RS485 Half Duplex connected 6B ... With the system property '-Dibm.swapLF=true', the byte '0x15' gets converted to '0x25. Local fix. If the data needs to be processed as binary, use the byte stream as it as and avoid converting to string Problem summary. In zOS, both bytes 0x15 and 0x25 are valid for a newline character. For applications deployed on mainframe (zOS) systems which interact with non-EBCDIC platforms, the system ... (last updated: 2019-03-15 @ 02:45 EST / 2019-03-15 @ 06:45 UTC ) Binary collations are, in many ways, simpler to understand than non-binary collations... Binary options watchdog virnetx yahoo / Float point number representation binary options; GTA gtis Forex / Buffet book on investing; It invest android; Binary option mania 2020; Crane Forex bureau uganda / Accurate binary options indicator; Binary option indicator metatrader 4; What is d difference between investment and speculation ; Spy etf / Warren buffett investing book; Gold binary ... In a typical Rust binary that links the standard library, execution starts in a C runtime library called crt0 (“C runtime zero”), which sets up the environment for a C application. This includes creating a stack and placing the arguments in the right registers. The C runtime then invokes the entry point of the Rust runtime, which is marked by the start language item. Rust only has a very ... NOTE: This needs to be specified if you are going to use any of the following options. See Customizing devices and services for the format. ignored boolean (Optional, default: false) Ignore this entity completely. It won’t be shown in the Web Interface and no events are generated for it. polling_intensity integer (Optional, default: 0) Enables polling of a value and sets the frequency of ...

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